Apollo experience report:  Test and checkout by Mechelay, J. E.
N A S A  TECHNICAL NOTE NASA TN D-7683 
M 
00 
h 
a 
z c 
U 
L/) 
4 z C A  !LE 
COPY# 
APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT - 
TEST AND CHECKOUT 
by Joseph E. Mecibelay 
Lyndon B. Johnson S p a e  Center 
Houston, Texm 77058 
N A T I O N A L  AERONAUTICS A N D  SPACE ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D. C. M A Y  1974 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19740015286 2020-03-23T08:36:48+00:00Z
3. Recipient's Catalog No. 
5. Report Date 
1. Reporr Nu. 2. Government Accession No. 
TN D-7683 
4. Title and Subtitle 
._ . - - - 
7. Auttwr(s1 
APOLLOEXPERIENCEREPORT 
TEST AND CHECKOUT 
8. Performing Organization Report No. 
May 1974 ~ 
6. Performing Organization Code t- 
K G e y  Words (Suggested by Author(s)) 
* Space Vehicle Checkout Program 
' Test Documentation 
* Spacecraft Testing 
' Acceptance 
' Retesting Plans 
* Test Philosophy 
' Apollo Testing 
-.--.-_I_ I 
-- 
18. Distribution Statement 
Subject Category 31 
JSC S-392 
1 c W o r k  Unit No. 
-II_---__ Joseph E. Mechelay, JSC 
l-.-._l. --- __ I -.- 
19. Security Classif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of  this page) 21. NO. of Pages 
None None 39 
9. Performing Organization Name and Address 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
22.  Price 
$3.25 
11. Contract or  Grant No. 
- t 13. Type of Report and Period Covered Houston, Texas 77058 --_._I--____I-. ~ _.__I- __ -I--__ - - 
2 .  Sponsoring Agency Name and Address 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Washington, D. C. 20546 
I Technical Note 
14. Sponsoring Agency Code 
6. Abstract 
The problem areas  encountered during the development of the acceptance testing and preflight 
checkout requirements and procedures for Apollo spacecraft are discussed. Recommendations 
a r e  given for cases in which methods used in the Apollo Program a r e  considered to apply to future 
space flight programs. 
CONTENTS 
Section 
SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
CHECKOUT DOCUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
CHANGE IMPLEMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
TEST CONFIGURATION CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
RETEST PHILOSOPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
General Retest Ground Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Retest Ground Rules for Electrical Assemblies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Retest Ground Rules for Fluid and Mechanical Systems . . . . . . . . . . .  
DESTACKING CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
DESIRABILITY O F  PREINSTALLATION ACCEPTANCE TESTS . . . . . . . .  
FACTORY OR FIELD TESTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
USE OF NONFLIGHT EQUIPMENT DURING CHECKOUT . . . . . . . . . . . .  
DESIRABILITY O F  PROPULSION SYSTEM FIRING TESTS . . . . . . . . . . .  
VACUUM TESTING CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
CREW EQUIPMENT STOWAGE TESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
CHECKOUT O F  REDUNDANT FUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
INTEGRATED SUBSYSTEM CHECKOUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
CHECKOUTTOLERANCES . . . . . .  i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
APPENDMA-GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
APPENDIX B - APOLLO PROGRAM DIRECTIVE NO . 26B . . . . . . . . . .  
Page 
1 
1 
2 
5 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
8 
8 
8 
14 
15 
15 
16 
16 
17 
18 
18 
21 
23 
iii 
FIGURES 
Figure Page 
Example of documentation of test requirements and 
3 
4 
1 
specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Example of form used for test change notices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
3 Factory checkout flow 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
(a) Part  1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(b) P a r t 2 . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(c) Y a r t 3 . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(d) P a r t 4 . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
( e )  P a r t s . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4 The KSC test sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
iv 
APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
TEST AND CHECKOUT 
By Joseph E. Mechelay 
Lyndon B. Johnson  Space Center  
SUMMARY 
Acceptance testing of Apollo spacecraft was conducted during manufacturing and 
assembly to determine conformity to design or specifications as a basis for acceptance. 
Testing at the launch site was conducted primarily to reverify performance of individ- 
ual launch vehicle stages and modules as received from the factory. Experience gained 
in  dealing with many of the problems encountered during the Apollo Program in these 
areas of activity can be applied to future space flight programs. The following repre- 
sentative problem a reas  are discussed: checkout documentation, change implementa- 
tion, test configuration control, re tes t  philosophy, destacking considerations, 
desirability of preinstallation acceptance tests,  factory o r  field testing, use of nonflight 
equipment during checkout, desirability of propulsion system firing tests,  vacuum test-  
ing considerations, crew equipment stowage tests,  checkout of redundant functions, in- 
tegrated subsystem checkout, and checkout tolerances. 
INTRODUCTION 
The original Apollo philosophy was to provide flight-ready vehicles to the launch 
site.  The reasons for establishing this objective were twofold: first, the early detec- 
tion of any hardware defects would result  in an earlier resolution of any problem and, 
second, the factory would be better equipped to replace hardware. This philosophy was 
not completely realized because par ts  were not available and because subsequent iden- 
tification of requirements for  some testing facilities required the installation of the 
par t s  a t  locations other than the factories for reasons of safety and economy. 
Acceptance testing of an Apollo spacecraft was conducted in  conjunction with the 
manufacturing and assembly process. Testing was conducted at the launch s i te  pr imar-  
ily to ensure that the performance of each subsystem had not degraded after factory 
checkout and to verify that the spacecraft/launch vehicle interface, launch team, and 
launch support equipment were ready. 
Problem a reas  encountered during the Apollo Program are discussed in this re- 
port. In general, the a reas  discussed are within the scope of the spacecraft testing ac- 
tivities; however, several  examples pertain to launch vehicle testing. Two approaches 
are taken in  the  discussion of the test  and checkout activities. One approach is to state 
conditions o r  procedures that led to difficulties, then describe how the situation was 
rectified and recommend approaches for future programs. In other cases ,  recommen- 
dations a re  given for dealing with general problem areas without reference to specific 
problems. A glossary of special t e rms  is given in appendix A. 
CHECKOUT DOCUMENTATION 
The preparation and control of test  and checkout plans and the procedures f o r  
preparation and launch of Apollo spacecraft were specified in Apollo Program Direc- 
tive No. 26-B. This directive (reproduced in appendix B) required that the NASA 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) (formerly the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC)) 
prepare and approve a Test and Checkout Requirements Document and a Test and Check- 
out Specifications Document for submittal to the John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) 
4 months before delivery of a flight vehicle. These documents, in turn, provided the 
basis for the development of the test and checkout plans by KSC. 
Developing two separate documents for each vehicle resulted in the documents 
being organized such that cross-referencing was inconvenient. This led to misunder- 
standings between the design engineers and the tes t  engineers concerning the compat- 
ibility of specifications and requirements. The problem was subsequently rectified by 
combining the documents into one so that a specification with an appropriate tolerance 
is given for each requirement (fig. 1). Future programs should follow the same ap- 
proach for specifying test and checkout requirements and tolerances. Other documen- 
tation schemes that have worked well and should be applied to future programs are as 
follows. 
1. The launch-site and factory test plans followed the internal indexing o r  num- 
bering system of the Test and Checkout Requirements Document. This consistency in 
numbering provided a convenient method of tracking requirements through all test 
documentation. 
2. One document w a s  used as a basis for all vehicles. Then, at  each revision, 
the requirements peculiar to vehicles that had been launched were deleted, and new re- 
quirements were incorporated. This technique not only reduced the paper volume but 
also kept the document current and minimized the amount of outdated material. An 
additional advantage was that continuity was maintained from vehicle to vehicle. 
3. Changes to the test  documentation at KSC were made by test  change notices 
(MSC Form 653, fig. 2), which described the present and proposed requirements and 
the justification for  the change. All test  change notices were approved by the Program 
Manager except i n  cases  in  which a delay in approval could have resulted in problems 
in  meeting scheduled milestones or in  cases  where the change had been previously ap- 
proved through Configuration Control Panel/Configuration Control Board action. In 
these instances, the signature authority w a s  delegated to the resident manager of the 
Apollo Spacecraft Program Office at KSC. The most significant aspect of the change 
system was the minimal amount of paperwork required to make a change. Any organi- 
zation could generate the change and submit it for  approval immediately, if required. 
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CHANGE IMPLEMENTATION 
Hardware, software, and procedural changes requiring implementation during 
testing and checkout led to difficulties that could have been prevented if inadequacies 
had been recognized earlier.  Examples of difficulties that were experienced are cited 
in  the following paragraphs, and procedures to minimize delays and prevent accidents 
a r e  recommended. 
Tests were disrupted when connectors were disconnected or ground support equip- 
ment (GSE) was shut off to permit a change. A technique was developed to alleviate 
problems of this nature by including periods in  the test flow to incorporate blocks of 
changes. Use of this technique allowed uninterrupted testing and optimized work ac- 
complishment during modification periods. 
In some cases, malfunctions resulted when seemingly straightforward activities 
that should have been conducted in series were performed in parallel. During a modi- 
fication period, all activities should be controlled in a manner similar to that exercised 
during the test  activity. This provides proper integration of all activities and ensures 
that systems safety is not compromised. 
Another difficulty occurred when all aspects of a major change were not incor- 
porated at one time, even though modification periods were in effect. The compatibility 
of a total change was normally proofed in an integrated systems ground test article, but 
a partial change was  generally not tested in that program. Partial changes resulted in 
many aborted acceptance tests.  A procedure should be implemented to flag partial 
change incorporation. A special assessment must be made to determine the effective- 
ness of tests that a r e  conducted before completion of the total change. 
Another area of concern was the cancellation of a major change after i t  had been 
partially incorporated. In some cases, partially incorporated changes resulted in un- 
necessary equipment and circuits that could have caused flight failures. For example, 
electrical wiring installed as part of a major change and left installed after the major 
change was canceled resulted in an electrical shorting condition in the command mod- 
ule during one unmanned Apollo flight, An administrative procedure is required to pre- 
vent this type of occurrence. 
The converse of the preceding example also applies. Changes incorporated to 
deactivate equipment already installed require positive assurance that all interfaces 
have been deactivated. For electromechanical equipment, deactivating only the me- 
chanical functions could produce an electrical hazard or  result in a flight failure. In 
the command module, a waste management system blower w a s  deactivated by discon- 
necting and plugging the hardlines; however, electrical control of the blower was  not 
changed or  deactivated. The inadvertent activation of a switch caused the blower to 
operate against a deadheaded system, resulting in  burning out the blower motor. The 
failure modes and effects analysis should be updated for each contemplated change to 
prevent situations such as this from occurring. 
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TEST CONFIGURATION CONTROL 
The vehicle configuration must be verified before any test  is started. This veri- 
fication includes determining that the latest modifications have been incorporated; as- 
suring that all required components have been installed, required electrical connectors 
mated, and fluid lines connected; and assuring that cabin valves, circuit breakers, and 
switches a re  in proper positions. With respect to the GSE, the setup must be verified, 
the required fluid samples taken, and the switchhalve configuration verified. 
Once the test  is started,  rigid control must be exercised to maintain test disci- 
pline. This is accomplished by having approved procedures for test  and by requiring 
documentation of discrepancies. (Documentation of checkout test  anomalies proved to 
be very difficult to control during the Apollo Program. ) Usually, discrepant conditions 
should be analyzed before a test  is continued, but this is not always possible. Discrep- 
ancies should be thoroughly documented as to how the vehicle/GSE is configured and how 
the problem manifests itself. The troubleshooting philosophy should be approved, and 
each step must be documented before its accomplishment. 
For example, during the prelaunch checkout of the Apollo 16 spacecraft, a situa- 
tion occurred as  a result  of improper test  configuration evaluation. During the trouble- 
shooting of a leaking quick-disconnect fitting, the pressure was vented from the GSE 
manifold to facilitate the valve changeout. However, the GSE/spacecraft configuration 
was such that venting of the manifold placed a negative pressure on the spacecraft burst 
disks. This negative pressure caused the burst disks to rupture and the spacecraft 
propellant tank bladders to collapse. As a result, the spacecraft had to be destacked 
so that the propellant tanks and integral bladders could be replaced. 
RETEST PHILOSOPHY 
There a re  many instances during the lifetime of a vehicle when connectors a r e  
disconnected, lines broken, components replaced, and s imilar  actions taken. Occur- 
rences  such as  these cause loss of confidence in previously established test  integrity; 
therefore, a retest philosophy and plan are required. System-level and vehicle-level 
acceptance tests a r e  continually proofing the integrity of the entire svstem and/or 
vehicle. A plan that will set  forth the philosophy and basic requirements fo r  the re -  
establishment of proof of integrity is required in  the early stages of checkout. The 
detailed retest plan will be a major undertaking in  any future program. Such a plan 
was developed for the Apollo Program. This plan contained a matrix of all spacecraft 
connectors and showed where the integrity of each connector w a s  verified during the 
checkout process. Many connectors were verified more than once, and this plan r e -  
flected each verification. Because of this matrix, rapid determinations of retest  r e -  
quirements were easily made. In addition, when verification of connectors could be 
delayed until a later test date, valuable test  time w a s  saved because special re tes ts  
were not required. The retest  philosophy used in the Apollo Program is presented in 
the following subsections. This philosophy is recommended as a baseline for retest  
requirements. 
General Retest Ground Ru les  
Reverification may require additional testing or  may utilize downstream testing, 
but the reverification should be accomplished before beginning the Flight Readiness 
Test. However, i f  troubleshooting or a replacement is required during the Flight 
Readiness Test,  the reverification must be accomplished before completing the Flight 
Readiness Test by rerunning the appropriate test procedures sequences. The documen- 
tation that identifies and authorizes the operation resulting in invalidation of previous 
testing must include the specific retest  requirements for reverification and the vehicle 
or test constraints. 
Retest procedures for each connector, control panel, and spacecraft component 
should be prepared before test as  an adjunct to the standard operational test procedures. 
Retesting combinations of panels, components, and connectors will often result in some 
items being checked two or  more times. The number of combinations involved is enor- 
mous. Constraints, switch matrices, and GSE usage, for example, have to be evalu- 
ated. Because of these factors, retest procedures cannot always be preplanned unless 
it is decided to repeat all basic operational checkout procedures, which would necessi- 
tate excessive retest time. It w a s  often necessary in the Apollo Program to create re-  
test  procedures in real  time by combining parts of existing procedures and creating new 
ones as the case demanded. 
Retest Ground  R u l e s  for  Electr ical Assemblies 
Before a replacement assembly is installed, i t  must be preinstallation tested in 
accordance with existing specifications and time limitations to verify that the assembly, 
by itself, meets the required performance criteria. Any suspect or failed assembly 
removed f rom the spacecraft must be recycled through a preinstallation test and any 
additional bench-level test required to isolate malfunctions. Units that exhibit inter- 
mittent failures should not be reinstalled in the spacecraft until the cause of the failure 
is found and corrected. 
When an electronic assembly is replaced in the spacecraft by a different unit, all 
functional modes and all functional paths to and through the replacement assembly should 
be reverified and, in some instances, an end-to-end recalibration conducted. Nonsus- 
pect assemblies removed from the spacecraft to  allow access to other equipment do not 
require bench-level testing before reinstallation. In this instance, an interface integrity 
test should be performed. All connectors that are demated must have continuity rever- 
ified after remating. After replacement or repair, continuity and electrical isolation 
should be reverified. 
Retest G r o u n d  Ru les  for F l u i d  and Mechan ica l  Systems 
The replacement of components or  the breaking of any fluid system requires, a t  
a minimum, leak tests of the remated connections and cleanliness reverification of the 
reworked area. Functional verification in the spacecraft is required on replaced 
components. 
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Mechanical assemblies that have been functionally tested in  the spacecraft and 
subsequently invalidated because of removal o r  replacement (or both) of a component 
should be reverified for fit and function. 
DESTACKI NG CONS1 DERATIONS 
Destacking is the process of disassembling the stages or modules of a vehicle. 
Every destacking means possible vehicle damage, and retest  is required to reestablish 
interface integrity. To maintain vehicle integrity in  multimodule and multistage vehi- 
cles,  destacking requirements should be minimized during the production acceptance 
test  phase. The checkout flow and modification periods have to be optimized early to 
allow accomplishment of this objective. Too often, after the final acceptance tes ts  of 
a vehicle in the factory, the vehicle w a s  taken apart and reworked with the retest  re- 
quirements passed on to the launch site, o r  the vehicle was destacked for  shipment. 
At the launch site,  some normal, noncontingent requirements may also dictate that the 
vehicle should be destacked. However, destacking should be avoided, and the total pro- 
duction test and checkout flow should result in a continuous buildup process terminating 
in  a stacked vehicle. Test  locales should be planned to minimize vehicle movement 
during checkout. 
DESIRABILITY OF PREINSTALLATION ACCEPTANCE TESTS 
A review of the Apollo preinstallation acceptance testing program disclosed that 
these tests often "crutched" inadequate vendor acceptance tests. The usual reason w a s  
thkt the test equipment, test procedures, test methods, and measurement systems used 
by the vendor generally differed from those used by the prime contractor. Under these 
conditions, if preinstallation acceptance tes ts  a r e  not conducted at the prime contrac- 
tor's facility, problems will be encountered during vehicle-level tests.  To resolve this 
problem, the vendor acceptance tes t  equipment, procedures, and methods should be 
closely screened by the prime contractor and the responsible Government personnel to 
ensure that all requirements a r e  acceptable. The vendor acceptance tes t  would then 
serve as the preinstallation test. 
FACTORY OR FIELD TEST1 NG 
The purpose of launch-site testing is to reverify performance of the individual 
stages and modules, as received from the factory, through the performance of inte- 
grated systems tes ts .  These tes ts  should be followed by buildup of the space vehicle 
and the verification of all functional interfaces between the stages and modules, such 
as the command and service module (CSM)/launch vehicle interface. No new o r  f i r s t -  
time tests should be performed on the individual stages or modules a t  the launch site.  
A flow diagram of the typical acceptance test  activities fo r  the CSM is shown in fig- 
ure  3 .  Typical launch-site test  activities a r e  shown in figure 4. 
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mate verification 
- vehicle pre-electrical 
Flight-readiness firings and initial environmental tes ts  should meet factory or 
special-test-site requirements. Complete functional and environmental tes ts  of the 
various Saturn launch vehicle stages occurred before delivery of the launch vehicles 
to the launch site. However, static firings were not conducted on Apollo spacecraft 
propulsion systems because of the unique considerations resulting from the use of en- 
gines requiring hypergolic propellants. These considerations were,  primarily,  that 
the propulsion systems were difficult to purge and clean, the propellant caused corro- 
sion of system components, and the toxicity of the propellant presented a hazardous 
working condition. 
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Two different vacuum-chamber tests were conducted on the Apollo spacecraft. 
For economy, the chambers were installed a t  KSC to reduce the requirements for con- 
struction of special facilities at  the prime contractor's plants and to allow the vacuum 
chambers to be used fo r  follow-on programs. Hazardous tests of manned modules, 
such as vacuum-chamber altitude simulations, should be conducted late in  the tes t  flow. 
At that time, the spacecraft modules a r e  closer to flight configuration and greater as- 
surance of crew safety exists. 
t 
Launch escape system 
USE OF NONFLIGHT EQUIPMENT DURING CHECKOUT 
Countdown 
demonstration Countdown Pressure test and 
In the Apollo Program, the use  of nonflight equipment or substitute units during 
vehicle-level tes ts  was  a continuous source of discussion. These units were used when 
repeated testing o r  continuous cycling could be detrimental to cri t ical  flight i tems. For  
example, nonflightworthy reaction control engines were used for  lunar module factory 
checkout. Substitute units may be required f o r  use in  place of sensitive electronic 
packages, especially those exhibiting a high change rate or  a high failure rate. The 
same principle applies to guidance computer programs,  o r  software, in  which late 
availability could be a problem. 
- hypergolic servicing weight and balance and thrust vector alinement 
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One argument against using nonflight hardware and software is that i t  may not 
represent the proper flight configuration. This is especially undesirable during a 
period in  which change activity is high. This situation can be controlled with a rigid 
configuration management system that ensures change effectivity in  the flight substi- 
tutes. Questions then will arise as to when in  the test  flow flight software should be 
used instead of test  software and when substitute units should no longer be used. Apollo 
experience indicates that flight software can be incorporated into the spacecraft ex- 
tremely late i n  the launch-site checkout flow, provided that rigorous means of verifica- 
tion and reverification by an independent source have been used. 
DESIRABILITY OF PROPULSION SYSTEM F I R I N G  TESTS 
The requirement for stage- o r  module-level propulsion system firing tests,  often 
called flight-readiness firings, was another debatable issue.  Every stage of the Saturn 
launch vehicle was subjected to an aeceptance firing. It has been stated that a vehicle- 
level firing test additionally serves  as a good vibration test for  all vehicle equipment. 
This was t rue for the launch vehicle stages because the vibration environment during 
ground firing was  more severe than that encountered during flight. However, this was 
not true for all spacecraft propulsion modules because of the lower thrust levels of 
some engines. This issue must be settled early in  subsequent programs so that the 
vehicles can be built and the test flow planned to accommodate an acceptance firing. 
The Apollo lunar module ascent and descent engines were not capable of being 
fired at sea level conditions, and purging and cleanup requirements after firing of en- 
gines using hypergolic propellant would have decreased the confidence that the firing 
had produced. The Apollo service module engine also was not acceptance fired after 
installation because of the hypergolic considerations. However, production units were 
successfully fired during unmanned flights of both vehicles. An additional confidence 
firing of a nonflight production service module was  performed. Satisfactory system 
performance w a s  verified, but teardown of the system confirmed the existence of 
contamination and corrosion, thus reinforcing the decision not to perform ground 
firings of flight systems. Arguments against acceptance firings are the increased 
cost and the scheduling problems that would result. 
VACUUM TESTING CONS1 DERATIONS 
In the Apollo Program, vehicle-level vacuum tests  were conducted late in the 
test and checkout flow. An "all uprf vehicle (a  completely assembled CSM) was sub- 
jected to the vacuum environment to find faults that result  f rom vacuum-induced expan- 
sion, and the complete environmental control system (ECS) was tested with the suited 
crewmen. Because vehicle-level tes ts  were conducted, not all individual systems and 
equipment were previously exposed to a vacuum environment. It is recommended, how- 
ever,  that vacuum testing of specific systems and types of equipment be accomplished 
before vehicle-level testing to minimize the possibility of problems in  the later tes ts  
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and the resulting impact on schedules. A s  a minimum, the following categories of 
equipment should be individually tested in  a vacuum environment. 
1. Items for  which additional confidence is desired, such as life-support systems 
equipment 
2. Items that have marginal or questionable environmental sensitivity, such as 
electronic equipment packages containing soft potting 
3.  Items that would require destacking or removal of a major structure fo r  their 
replacement 
CREW EQU I PMENT STOWAGE TESTS 
Manned spacecraft test programs should include crew equipment stowage tes t s  at  
the factory to ensure the adequacy of storage space and to check accessibility and utility. 
Because crew equipment is generally one of the last  i tems to be delivered, the require- 
ment for these tes ts  establishes f i rm goals for crew equipment delivery. The initial 
tests should be conducted by experienced crewmen to ensure that the stowage will be 
acceptable in  the flight environment. 
CHECKOUT OF REDUNDANT FUNCTl ONS 
Crew safety w a s  enhanced by minimizing the number of single-point-failure possi- 
bilities in  the Apollo spacecraft design. This was accomplished primarily by providing 
completely separate or alternate systems to perform the same function. If a mission 
function was critical, two identical primary paths were provided, and both paths usually 
operated simultaneously. Within each parallel path, additional se r ies  redundancy was 
usually provided when the paths contained crit ical  par ts  and components. Parallel re-  
dundancy assured that a function was accomplished when required; se r ies  redundancy 
assured that a function would not be accomplished before it w a s  required. 
In addition to the primary mode, a secondary o r  backup mode was provided fo r  
very critical functions. The backup mode w a s  generally a manual and more direct  
method of accomplishing the mission function; that is, it bypassed some of the devices 
that had to operate in each of the primary paths. The backup mode generally did not 
operate simultaneously with the primary mode, and redundancy may or  may not have 
been incorporated. 
An example is given for additional clarification. Escape-tower jettison was a 
mission function required in  the manual launch sequence. The primary mode of tower 
jettison was ignition of the tower jettison motor and separation of the tower bolts. This 
was accomplished automatically by the mission sequencers. Full end-to-end parallel 
redundancy w a s  provided f rom the initiating mechanism to the function-accomplishing 
mechanism. One of the parallel paths was called the primary path and the other the 
redundant path. The backup mode for tower jettison was initiated manually. A switch 
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was actuated that ignited the launch escape motor and separated the tower bolts. This 
use of more than one relay, either parallel- or  series-installed, provided circuit 
redundancy. 
Three aspects of verifying proper operation of redundant functions and backup 
modes need to be considered; each usually requires a separate test  and checkout 
method. The processes a r e  as follows. 
1 1. The primary and redundant functions a re  tested in  three steps in  the space- 
craft. Each parallel path is tested individually, end to end, and the parallel paths a r e  
tested simultaneously in the third step. This three-step checkout does not test  the 
backup mode. 
2. The backup mode is tested in one step, end to end. 
3.  The previously described end-to-end tests verify the open (permissive) posi- 
tion of the redundancy. To verify the closed position, each item is checked separately. 
This is a relatively easy task if  test points a r e  provided between each item. These test  
points, however, are frequently not designed into the equipment for spacecraft-level 
checkout, and a true test can only be made during component fabrication or assembly 
and checkout of the equipment before installation in the spacecraft. 
Adequate testing a t  the factories constitutes complete verification of all redundant 
functions (case 1) and all backup modes (case 2) and a partial verification of redundancy 
(case 3). The redundancy verification not accomplished at a spacecraft level must be 
identified. Checkout of the redundant functions at the launch site should be accomplished 
as late as is practical i n  the spacecraft flow and should include all the redundant and 
backup modes that can be assessed. 
1 NTEGRATED SUBSYSTEM CHECKOUT 
The initial lunar module checkout philosophy was to verify each subsystem indi- 
vidually before verification of the next subsystem. This process w a s  extremely long 
and costly. To save factory test  time and to use the GSE hardware and software capa- 
bilities to their fullest advantage, an integrated subsystem checkout concept was im- 
plemented. This concept allowed several  subsystems to be under test  simultaneously 
under overall control of a master test  document. With this method, when checkout of 
one subsystem was constrained because of an anomaly, the checkout flow for the re- 
maining subsystems could continue. This philosophy did require considerable planning 
1 The t e rm "primary and redundant functions'' refers to the operation of both 
paths of a pair  of similarly constructed primary paths used to accomplish a single 
mission function. 
2The t e r m  "redundancy" refers, in  this sense, to the provision of two or more 
identical par t s  o r  components used in a primary o r  redundant function o r  backup mode 
path. 
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effort to optimize the testing, troubleshooting, repairs,  and replacements and to reduce 
the number of test constraints. The end result was that the spacecraft delivery mile- 
stones were met with substantially less test time on the spacecraft than under the pre- 
vious system of testing each subsystem independently. 
CHECKOUT TOLERANCES 
Satisfactory performance of the ECS was difficult to verify during factory checkout 
of the first manned vehicle. An investigation revealed that the tolerance values being 
used for vehicle-level tests were those specified by the supplier for the individual com- 
ponents. The results were that many failures were being reported, components were 
being replaced unnecessarily, and the resulting retests  were severely hampering the 
checkout flow. The tolerance being used did not take into account test configuration and 
GSE differences that did not permit measuring to these tight tolerances. Consequently, 
the tolerances were adjusted to the mission requirements and then narrowed from these 
values by a root-sum-square technique that accounted for GSE inaccuracies and space- 
craft hardware measurement tolerances. Subsequent vehicle checkout progressed sat- 
isfactorily and no flight failures that could be attributed to checkout tolerances being 
too broad have been observed. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although Apollo test and checkout methods were based, to a large extent, on ex- 
perience gained from previous programs, many additional lessons were learned as the 
Apollo Program progressed. Some of the more significant aspects of Apollo acceptance 
testing and preflight checkout experience have been discussed, and recommendations 
for future programs a r e  summarized here. 
1. The Apollo test documentation method of combining requirements and specifi- 
cations into a multiple-spacecraft document is practical and is recommended for future 
use. 
2.  Rigidly controlled procedures are recommended for the incorporation and 
testing of hardware and software changes made during the acceptance testing and check- 
out process. In addition, vehicle/support equipment configuration control and documen- 
tation control must be strictly adhered to during all tes t  periods. 
3. A comprehensive retest  plan is required during the early stages of checkout, 
delineating requirements for demonstration of vehicle integrity after replacements, 
modifications, repair ,  e t  cetera. Retention of the Apollo philosophy as a baseline fo r  
establishing retest  requirements is recommended. 
4. Requirements for  destacking of multimodule or  multistage vehicles should be 
held to a minimum during the production acceptance-test phase. 
favor of vendor acceptance tests. 
5. Consideratim should be given to deleting preinstallation acceptance tests in 
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6. Where feasible, new or  first-time tests should not be performed on individ- 
ual stages o r  modules a t  the launch site; these tests should be conducted at  the factory. 
7. The use of nonflight equipment for checkout should be discouraged. When 
substitutes a r e  required, the design should duplicate the functional characteristics of 
the flight items. 
8. Where feasible, at least one propulsion system firing should be conducted 
on a flight-configured stage or  module as a proof of the production, test ,  and checkout 
processes. 
9. Vacuum testing should be performed at the component (black box) or highest 
practical level of assembly on all flight equipment susceptible to failure under vacuum 
exposure. This should be performed before vehicle vacuum testing. 
10. A crew equipment stowage test should be conducted at the factory. 
11. Complete verification of all redundant functions and backup modes should be 
accomplished at the factory, and, to the extent possible, component redundancy should 
be verified. The redundancy verification not accomplished at the spacecraft level must 
be identified. Checkout of the redundant functions at the launch site should be accom- 
plished as late as is practical and should include all redundant and backup modes that 
can be assessed. 
12. Apollo factory experience indicates that parallel checkout of selected space- 
craft subsystems is a practical consideration and can decrease overall checkout time. 
13. Checkout tolerances should be based on mission requirements and should 
consider the accuracy of both the spacecraft and ground support equipment measuring 
systems. 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, January 23, 1974 
914-11-00-00-72 
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APPENDIX A 
GLOSSARY 
All-up vehicle - A completely assembled module 
Bench-level testing - Testing performed on a component basis or module basis outside 
the spacecraft 
Failure mode and effects analysis - Analysis of failure modes and their effect on sys- 
tems and on mission performance 
Flight Readiness Test - Last major test conducted before the Countdown Demonstration 
Test to verify that all spacecraft systems are  in  a state of flight readiness; in- 
cludes systems compatibility during abort modes and during a normal mission 
Functional mode - The terminal activity o r  indication that is the end result of a trans- 
mitted signal o r  initiating force 
Functional path - One or more routes by which a transmitted signal or initiating force 
can be directed to accomplish a desired activity or indication 
Interface integrity - Completeness of mechanical, electrical, and functional mate of 
two or more modules or  stages 
Software - Computer programing, test procedures 
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APOLLO PROGRAM D I  RECTIVE NO. 266 

OFFICE OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT 
PROGRAM DIRECTIVE 
I I 
DATE 
December 8, 1970 M-D MA 1400.135 
(Proiect) 
APOLLO PROGRAM DIRECTIVE NO. 2 6 ~  
TO : DISTRIBUTION FROM : 
L d , %  
ROCCO A. PETRONE 
APOLLO PROGRAM DIRECTOR 
SUBJECT: Addendum 1 t o  Apollo Program Direct ive No. 2 6 ~  
Preparation of Test and Checkout Plans and Procedures at  KSC 
I. PURPOSE 
The purpose of t h i s  addendum i s  t o  requi re  t h a t  proper l e v e l s  of  
approval f o r  hazardous test  and checkout of troubleshooting pro- 
cedures be iden t i f i ed  i n  KSC Operations Direct ives .  
11. Hazardous Operations Approval Requirements 
KSC Operations Direct ives  s h a l l  i den t i fy  approval l e v e l s  f o r  tes ts  
o r  troubleshooting procedures involving hazardous operat ions o r  t e s t  
o r  troubleshooting procedures not previously v e r i f i e d  at  t h e  launch 
or  fac tory  sites. 
111. Implementation 
The requirement es tab l i shed  by t h i s  addendum i s  e f f e c t i v e  immediately 
and implementation i s  appl icable  t o  a l l  missions. Copies of imple- 
menting in s t ruc t ions  s h a l l  be forwarded t o  MA. 
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APOLLO PROGRAM DIRECTIVE NO. 26-B 
MA OO9-026-1B 
DATE 
December 6 ,  1967 M-D 1400.075 
(Project) 
TO : DISTRIBUTION FROM : 
APOLLO PROGRAM DIRECTOR 
SUBJECT: Preparation of T e s t  and Checkout Plans and Procedures a t  KSC 
I. 
11. 
111. 
I V  . 
V. 
PURPOSE 
This  Program Direc t ive  covers t h e  preparat ion and cont ro l  of t es t  
and checkout plans and procedures f o r  t h e  preparat ion and launch 
of  Apollo-Saturn space vehic les  a t  KSC. 
SCOPE 
This  Direct ive def ines  t h e  requirements, r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and 
inter-center  coordination necessary t o  t h e  development, rev is ion  
and execution of t es t  and checkout p lans  and procedures f o r  t h e  
preparat ion and launch of Apollo-Saturn space vehic les  a t  KSC. 
RESPONSIBILITY 
The Directors  of KSC, MSC, and MSFC are responsible  f o r  taking ac- 
t i o n  as necessary t o  implement t h i s  Direct ive.  
assigned i n  t h i s  Direct ive may be delegated except i n  ins tances  
where t h e  delegat ion of r e spons ib i l i t y  s h a l l  be no lower than t h e  
l e v e l  spec i f ied  herein. 
Respons ib i l i t i es  
TIME COMPLIANCE 
This Direct ive i s  e f f ec t ive  f o r  a l l  subsequent Apollo/Saturn m i s -  
s ions  except t h a t  t h e  use of s tandardized names f o r  KSC Test and 
Checkout Plans and T e s t  and Checkout Procedures s h a l l  be e f f ec t ive  
f o r  AS-205 and AS-503 and subsequent missions. 
IMPLEMENT AT I ON 
A.  The Manned Space F l ight  Centers  s h a l l  prepare d i r e c t i v e s  t o  
implement t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  assigned here in  and submit copies  
t o  Apollo Program Director .  
B. Any inter-center  problem a r i s i n g  i n  t h e  implementation of t h i s  
Di rec t ive  which cannot be reso lved  s h a l l  be brought t o  t h e  
immediate a t t e n t i o n  of t h e  Apollo Program Director .  
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December 6, 1967 I M-D 2 1400.075 (Proiect) 
Development organizat ions (MSFC and MSC) are responsible  f o r  
def ining spec i f i c  t es t  and checkout requirements t h a t  must be 
performed on f l i g h t  vehicles  a t  the  f ac to ry  p r i o r  t o  acceptance 
and at  the  launch s i te  p r i o r  t o  f l i g h t .  
requirements t o  demonstrate t h e  performance of ground support 
equipment provided by t h e  development organization which i s  
assoc ia ted  with fac tory  acceptance and launch s i t e  preparat ion 
s h a l l  be included. The t e s t  and checkout requirements s h a l l  
c l e a r l y  def ine what i s  t o  be tes ted .  Test methods, hardware 
configurat ion,  test sequence and other cons t ra in ts  s h a l l  be 
iden t i f i ed  t o  t h e  extent  necessary t o  assure  attainment of 
t es t  objec t ives ,  p ro tec t  hardware from damage and provide f o r  
the  safety of personnel. 
The combined f ac to ry  and launch s i te  t e s t  and checkout require-  
ments s h a l l  provide an in tegra ted  flow of t e s t i n g .  The objec- 
t i v e  of t h e  in tegra ted  test  flow s h a l l  be t o  permit v e r i f i c a t i o n  
of  t h e  funct ional  performance of  e s sen t i a l  systems and t h e i r  
i n t eg ra t ion  i n t o  t h e  space vehic le  without unnecessary r epe t i -  
t i o n  of f ac to ry  l e v e l  t e s t i n g .  To t h e  extent  p rac t i cab le ,  t h e  
o v e r a l l  test flow s h a l l  permit cor re la t ion  of da ta  between 
f ac to ry  and launch s i t e  t e s t i n g  for  c r i t i c a l  f l i g h t  hardware 
components . 
Test and checkout 
Development organizat ions are responsible  fo r  providing tes t  
spec i f i ca t ions  and c r i t e r i a  or limits including r ed l ine  values  
and associated configuration cons t ra in ts  by which t o  judge 
acceptable  performance of f l i g h t  hardware and ground support 
equipment furnished by t h e  development organization. 
The development organizat ions use d i f fe ren t  t i t l e s  and formats 
for T e s t  and Checkout Requirements and Test Spec i f ica t ion  and 
Criteria documents. A t  t h e  e a r l i e s t  t i m e  convenient without 
republ ishing ex i s t ing  documents these s h a l l  be renamed as t h e  
T e s t  and Checkout Requirements Document and t h e  Test and 
Checkout Spec i f ica t ions  and Criteria Document. 
t h e  l a te r  document may be included as a p a r t  of t h e  T e s t  and 
Checkout Requirements Document. 
MSC and MSFC s h a l l  prepare and approve Test and Checkout Re- 
quirements and T e s t  and Checkout Specif icat ions and Criteria 
Documents f o r  t h e  f l i g h t  vehic les  and GSE which they develop. 
Approved documents s h a l l  be provided t o  t h e  launch organizat ion 
(KSC) no l a t e r  than four  months pr ior  t o  de l ivery  of f l i g h t  
vehic les  t o  t h e  Cape. 
If des i red ,  
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F. MSC i s  responsible  f o r  preparing f l i g h t  crew procedures f o r  
use on launch day and during f l i g h t .  These procedures and 
changes the re to  s h a l l  be made ava i lab le  t o  KSC f o r  use i n  pre- 
paring tes t  and checkout procedures involving f l i g h t  crew 
pa r t i c ipa t ion .  
G.  The above documentation provides t h e  framework within which 
t h e  launch organizat ion prepares  test  and checkout plans f o r  
in tegra t ing  a l l  t e s t  a c t i v i t i e s  at t h e  launch s i t e  and develops 
de t a i l ed  tes t  and checkout procedures f o r  each t e s t .  
V I I .  TEST AND CHECKOUT PLAN 
*A. A t es t  and checkout plan s h a l l  be prepared by KSC. It s h a l l  
provide an out l ine  f o r  accomplishing center  t es t  and checkout 
requirements a t  t h e  launch s i t e  and s h a l l  include any add i t iona l  
tes t  requirements necessary t o  v e r i f y  launch f a c i l i t y ,  i n t e r -  
face  and compatibi l i ty  with t h e  Mission Control Center - Houston 
and t h e  Manned Space F l igh t  Network, and launch crew readiness  
o r  s a t i s f y  range and sa fe ty  requirements. 
B. The following information s h a l l  be included: 
1. A flow plan designat ing t h e  sequence of t es t s  t o  be 
performed. 
2. Iden t i f i ca t ion  of  t h e  f a c i l i t i e s  involved i n  t h e  ove ra l l  
t es t  flow. 
3 .  Speci f ic  ou t l i nes  f o r  each test including t h e  following: 
a. T e s t  t i t l e  and procedure number. 
b .  Test ob jec t ives .  
c. T e s t  l oca t ion  and f a c i l i t y .  
d. Test descr ip t ion  i n  su f f i c i en t  d e t a i l  t o  def ine  t h e  
procedure i n  o u t l i n e  form. 
e. F l igh t  hardware and GSE configurat ion requirements. 
f .  Software requirements. 
*Denotes change. 
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g. 
h .  
i. 
5 .  
k.  
S igni f icant  support requirements. 
Iden t i f i ca t ion  of any hazardous operat ions.  
Safety requirements including any spec ia l  equipment, 
personnel, procedures or t r a i n i n g  required fo r  t es t .  
Iden t i fy  organizat ions outs ide of KSC t h a t  w i l l  be 
involved. 
A cross  reference t o  the development center  t e s t  
requirements where appl icable .  
4. A de ta i l ed  l i s t  of deviations from development center  
t e s t  requirements . 
V I I I .  TEST AND CHECKOUT PROCEDURES 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E.  
T e s t  and Checkout Procedures s h a l l  be prepesed by KSC. A 
T e s t  and Checkout Procedure s h a l l  def ine  t h e  de t a i l ed  step- 
by-step sequence of events i n  a spec i f i c  t e s t  and s h a l l  be 
generated fo r  each tes t  during preparation and launch of 
f l i g h t  vehicles .  
KSC and contractor  r e spons ib i l i t i e s  and in t e r f aces  i n  t h e  
preparat ion,  rev is ion  and execution of Test and Checkout 
Procedures s h a l l  be c l e a r l y  defined by a KSC Managenent 
Ins t ruc t ion  o r  other  s u i t a b l e  document approved by t h e  KSC 
Director .  This document s h a l l  designate t h e  o f f i c i a l ,  at an 
appropriately high l e v e l  i n  t h e  KSC organizat ion,  who i s  re -  
sponsible  f o r  determining which tests axe hazardous. 
MSC and MSFC may exercise  an option t o  review T e s t  and Check- 
out  Procedures as deemed necessary. Any recommended changes 
s h a l l  be provided t o  KSC no l a t e r  than 15  days p r io r  t o  the  
start of t h e  t es t .  
MSC and MSFC s h a l l  e s t a b l i s h  a mechanism t o  process launch 
s i te  recommended changes i n  fac tory  t e s t i n g .  
The following guidel ines  shall be used i n  the  preparat ion,  
rev is ion  and execution of KSC t e s t  and checkout procedures. 
1. Factory o r  t e s t  s i t e  t e s t  and checkout procedures which 
have been approved by t h e  development organizat ion s h a l l  
be used a s  a base l ine  i n  the development of Launch S i t e  
T e s t  and Checkout Procedures. Whenever poss ib le ,  T e s t  
and Checkout Procedures wr i t ten  f o r  use i n  the f ac to ry  
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w i l l  be modified f o r  use at t h e  launch s i t e  t o  f i t  unique 
f a c i l i t y  requirements, s a fe ty  considerat ions,  in tegra ted  
space vehic le  t e s t  requirements and t o  meet objec t ives  
i n  t he  t es t  and checkout plan. 
2. MSC i s  required t o  de l ive r  approved f l i g h t  crew procedures 
t o  KSC at  least  40 days p r i o r  t o  a t e s t  o r  checkout opera- 
t i o n  involving t h e  f l i g h t  c r e w  (See paragraph I X ,  B-2). 
Fl ight  Crew Procedures as approved and published by MSC 
s h a l l  be used by KSC when appl icable  i n  preparing those  
tes t  and checkout procedures involving t h e  f l i g h t  crew. 
I n  any cases where incompat ib i l i ty  between t e s t  and check- 
out procedures and f l i g h t  crew procedures e x i s t s ,  KSC 
w i l l  obtain MSC approval of t h e  T e s t  and Checkout 
Procedure. 
3 .  A l l  Test and Checkout Procedures involving hazardous op- 
e ra t ions  s h a l l  contain o r  provide spec i f i c  reference t o  
wr i t ten  in s t ruc t ions  f o r  ident i fy ing  emergency s i t u a t i o n s ,  
sa f ing  of hardware and implementing emergency 'act ions re- 
quired t o  evacuate o r  safeguard personnel and combat o r  
l i m i t  t he  extent  of t h e  damage should an emergency ar ise .  
4. Test and Checkout Procedures s h a l l  be standardized i n  
regard t o  the  following items. 
a. 
b .  
C .  
a. 
e. 
f .  
Q. 
Major pol icy  and procedure matters  regarding prepara- 
t i o n ,  review, approval and change cycle. 
Control, approval l e v e l  and documentation of t rouble-  
shooting during t h e  conduct of Test and Checkout 
Procedures. 
Extent of  q u a l i t y  cont ro l  pa r t i c ipa t ion  and s ign  off 
during execution of  T e s t  and Checkout Procedures. 
Extent of s a fe ty  and medical organizat ion pa r t i c ipa -  
t i on .  (See NMT 8900.1) 
Recording and approval level f o r  deviat ions encountered 
during implementation of Test and Checkout Procedures. 
Pol icy concerning mul t ip le  e f f e c t i v i t y  of Test and 
Checkout Procedures. 
Inclusion o r  exclusion of prepara t ion  s t eps  i n  Test 
and Checkout Procedures. 
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h. Recording of 01s channels during execution of Test 
and Checkout Procedures. 
i. Appropriate use of warning and caution notes.  
Pr ior  t o  publ icat ion of a test and checkout procedure (TCP) 
fo r :  (a )  operat ional  checkout of f l i g h t  hardware; (b )  func- 
t i o n a l  ve r i f i ca t ion  and operat ional  control  of GSE; and 
( c )  operat ional  ins t ruc t ions  t o  serv ice ,  handle, and t rans-  
por t  end item f l i g h t  hardware during prelaunch and launch 
operations;  it s h a l l  be approved by t h e  KSC Safety Off ice  
f o r  assurance t h a t  operations are compatible with KSC 
Safety c r i t e r i a  KMI 1710.13 and use appropriate  s a fe ty  
personnel, techniques,  and equipment. 
P r io r  t o  publ icat ion of a technical  procedure t o :  
t ho r i ze  work, ( b )  provide engineering in s t ruc t ions ;  and 
( c )  e s t ab l i sh  methods of work control ;  and involving 
hazardous operations,  it s h a l l  be approved by the  KSC 
Safety Office for assurance t h a t  operations a r e  compati- 
b l e  with KSC sa fe ty  c r i t e r i a  KMI 1710.13 and use appro- 
p r i a t e  s a fe ty  personnel,  techniques and equipment. 
(a )  au- 
Test  and checkout procedures involving human test subjec ts  
s h a l l  be coordinated with medical personnel f o r  assurance 
t h a t  po ten t i a l  r i s k s  t o  the  hea l th  of t e s t  subjec ts  are 
minimized. (See NMI 8900.1) 
Test and Checkout Procedures s h a l l  be provided t o  the  
KSC Launch Vehicle or Spacecraft Qual i ty  Survei l lance 
Division f o r  review and use i n  preparing for par t i c ipa t ion  
i n  test  and checkout operations.  
T e s t  and Checkout Procedures and changes the re to  f o r  t e s t s  
involving f l i g h t  crew par t ic ipa t ion  s h a l l  have s igna ture  
approval of MSC. 
Approved Test and Checkout Procedures s h a l l  be d i s t r ibu ted  
one month p r i o r  t o  the  date of t h e  t e s t .  
A T e s t  and Checkout Procedure control  system shall. be 
es tab l i shed  which places  posi t ive control  over changes 
subsequent t o  the  d i s t r ibu t ion  of approved copies t o  t h e  
test team. Only those changes i n  spacecraf t ,  launch vehi- 
c l e  or space vehic le  test and checkout procedures which 
w i l l  improve safe ty  or a r e  mandatory because of l a t e  
changes i n  hardware configuration s h a l l  be approved i n  
"Denotes change. 
~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~ 
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t he  l as t  seven calendar days before  scheduled start of a 
tes t  unless  approved by t h e  following organizat ional  l e v e l  
f o r  t he  t e s t  indicated.  
DATE 
December 6 ,  1967 M-D 1400.075 
(Proiect) 
a. Launch Operations Manager 
(1) Fl ight  Readiness 
( 2 )  Countdown Demonstration 
(3)  Countdown 
b.  Test Supervisor 
(1) 
(2 )  
( 3 )  
CSM or LM a l t i t u d e  chamber tests i n  MSOB 
CSM or LM f i n a l  in tegra ted  systems tes t  i n  MSOB 
CSM or LM in tegra ted  t e s t  i n  VAB or on pad p r i o r  
t o  mating with space vehic le  
L/V ove ra l l  t e s t s  1 and 2 i n  VAB or on pad (4) 
( 5 )  S/V overa l l  t es t s  1 and 2 i n  VAB or on pad 
( 6 )  
(7 )  
S/C or L/V propel lan t  loading on pad 
S/V simulated f l i g h t  i n  VAB or on pad 
( 8 )  Pyrotechnic i n s t a l l a t i o n  i n  VAB or on pad 
12. 
13. 
Revisions t o  Test and Checkout Procedures s h a l l  be pro- 
vided t o  t e s t  team members at  least 48 hours i n  advance 
of t he  start of t h e  t e s t .  Waivers t o  t h i s  requirement 
s h a l l  be approved at  t h e  organiza t iona l  level es tab l i shed  
by t h e  KSC Director  except t h a t  t h i s  approval cannot be 
delegated lower than spec i f i ed  i n  Vi11 E-11 above f o r  t h e  
t es t s  indicated.  
P r io r  t o  i n i t i a t i o n  of a t e s t ,  b r i e f ings  shall be con- 
ducted f o r  a l l  key members  of  t h e  t e s t  team t o  review 
t h e  sequence of t e s t  a c t i v i t i e s ,  t h e  T e s t  and Checkout 
Procedures and any hazardous operat ions or emergency 
procedures. 
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14. Pr io r  t o  i n i t i a t i n g  a t e s t ,  a review shall '  be  made of 
a l l  open work recorded aga ins t  t he  hardware t o  be t e s t e d .  
A determination s h a l l  be made t h a t  t he  hardware ( includ-  
ing GFE) i s  properly configured and t h a t  t h e  T e s t  and 
Checkout Procedure, F l igh t  Crew Procedure and hardware 
a r e  compatible. This determination s h a l l  be recorded 
and approved by KSC and contractor  organizat ions involved 
i n  t h e  t e s t .  The procedure f o r  recording and t h e  l e v e l  
of approval s h a l l  be as specif ied by t h e  KSC Direc tor .  
For spacecraf t  hardware t e s t s  involving f l i g h t  crew par- 
t i c i p a t i o n ,  t h i s  determination s h a l l  have s ignature  
approval of MSC. 
15. Approval t o  i n i t i a t e  non-hazardous t e s t s  s h a l l  be at  t h e  
organizat ional  l e v e l  es tabl ished by t h e  KSC Director .  
16. Approval t o  i n i t i a t e  any t e s t  involving a hazardous 
operat ion s h a l l  be at the  organizat ional  l e v e l  es tab l i shed  
by the  KSC Director  i n  accordance with VI11 E-11 above. 
17. The Director ,  MSC, and t h e  Director ,  MSFC, s h a l l  delegate  
the  au tho r i ty  e i t h e r  t o  KSC o r  t o  the  appropriate  o f f i c i a l  
of t h e i r  own organizat ions t o  approve r e a l  t i m e  deviat ions 
t o  Test and Checkout Procedures involving compromise i n  
t e s t  and checkout requirements. 
18. Changes i n  f l i g h t  hardware configurat ion,  t e s t  and check- 
out requirements, o r  t e s t  and checkout spec i f i ca t ions  
and c r i t e r i a  s h a l l  be approved by MSC and MSFC f o r  t h e  
spacecraf t  and launch vehicle  respect ively.  
19. The f l i g h t  crew s h a l l  use Test and Checkout Procedures' 
when pa r t i c ipa t ing  i n  f l i g h t  hardware t e s t s  at  t h e  launch 
s i te .  F l igh t  crews s h a l l  come under KSC cont ro l  during 
t h e  t i m e  they are a c t i v e l y  pa r t i c ipa t ing  i n  t e s t s  of f l i g h t  
vehic les  except t h a t  t h e  f l i g h t  crew may t ake  any ac t ion  
necessary f o r  i t s  sa fe ty .  
20. Deficiencies  encountered by t h e  f l i g h t  crew while par- 
t i c i p a t i n g  i n  KSC tes t s  s h a l l  be recorded and disposi-  
t ioned using the  same documentation system as t h a t  used 
by the  t es t  team. 
21. KSC s h a l l  make an ana lys i s  of T e s t  and Checkout Proce- 
dures deviat ions subsequent t o  completion of major tes ts  
f o r  t h e  purpose of reducing deviat ions i n  subsequent T e s t  
and Checkout Procedures. 
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22. Tests  involving hazardous operat ions s h a l l  not be con- 
ducted unless  communications are adequate t o  support 
emergency operat ions.  
I X .  CENTER RESPONSIBILITIES 
A. MSFC and MSC a re  responsible  f o r :  
1. Preparing an appropriate  document which assigns respon- 
s i b i l i t y  f o r  funct ions and ac t ions  contained herein.  
2. Establ ishing and maintaining t e s t  and checkout require-  
ments, t e s t  and checkout spec i f i ca t ions  and c r i t e r i a ,  
and launch mission rules inputs  which a r e  necessary t o  
assure  t e s t  and checkout and f l i g h t  readiness .  
3. Providing s ignature  approval on KSC tes t  and checkout 
plans.  
Approving deviat ions or waivers t o  t e s t  and checkout re- 
quirements, t e s t  and checkout spec i f i ca t ions  and c r i t e r i a ,  
and launch mission r u l e s  spec i f ied  i n  I X  A-2 above. 
4. 
5 .  Par t i c ipa t ion  i n  prepara t ion ,  rev is ion  and execution of 
KSC Test and Checkout Procedures i n  accordance with 
Sect ion V I I I .  
6. Assuring t h a t  adequate t e s t i n g  i s  being accomplished 
without unnecessary overlap and duplicat ion.  
7. Providing s ignature  approval on KSC c r i t e r i a  f o r  de te r -  
mining hazardous operat ions.  
B. MSC i s  responsible  f o r :  
1. Advising KSC i n  wr i t ing  of  t e s t s  requi r ing  f l i g h t  crew 
and/or f l i g h t  cont ro l  personnel pa r t i c ipa t ion .  
2. Providing approved f l i g h t  crew procedures t o  KSC at  
l e a s t  40 days p r i o r  t o  a t e s t  or checkout operation 
involving t h e  f l i g h t  crew. 
3 .  Providing s ignature  approval on KSC Test and Checkout 
Procedures involving f l i g h t  crew pa r t i c ipa t ion .  
Providing s ignature  approval on pre- tes t  reviews of 
spacecraf t  hardware ( inc luding  GFE) and T e s t  and Check- 
out Procedure compat ib i l i ty  f o r  those tes ts  involving 
f l i g h t  crew pa r t i c ipa t ion .  
4. 
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C .  KSC i s  responsible  for: 
1. Preparing an appropriate  document which ass igns  respon- 
s i b i l i t y  f o r  funct ions and act ions contained herein.  
2. Developing t e s t  and checkout plans as  defined i n  Sec- 
t i o n  V I 1  at  least one month p r i o r  t o  de l ivery  of f l i g h t  
hardware f o r  each mission. 
3. Securing MSC and MSFC signature  approval on t e s t  and 
checkout plans and changes there to  before  these  documents 
are approved or implemented. 
Preparing, rev is ing  and executing T e s t  and Checkout 
Procedures i n  accordance with Sect ion V I I I .  
4. 
5 .  Providing T e s t  and Checkout Procedures t o  MSC and MSFC 
one month p r io r  t o  t h e  s t a r t  of  a t e s t  and assuring 
expeditious d i s t r i b u t i o n  of changes the re to .  
Securing MSC signature  approval on T e s t  and Checkout 
Procedures and changes there to  and t h e  pre- tes t  reviews 
of spacecraf t  hardware and t e s t  and checkout procedure 
compatibi l i ty  f o r  those t e s t s  i n  which t h e  f l i g h t  crew 
has a requirement t o  par t ic ipa te .  
6 .  
7. Assuring t h a t  MSC f l i g h t  crew and f l i g h t  cont ro l  person- 
n e l  are in tegra ted  i n t o  the  KSC test team f o r  those t e s t s  
i n  which they have a requirement t o  pa r t i c ipa t e .  
Developing c r i t e r i a  for  determining hazwdous operat ions 
and securing s igna ture  approval of  MSC and MSFC. 
8. 
9.  Making f i n a l  determination t h a t  T e s t  and Checkout Proce- 
dures are adequate, safe and i n  accordance with develop- 
ment organizat ions t es t  and checkout requirements, t es t  
and checkout spec i f ica t ions  and c r i t e r i a ,  f l i g h t  crew 
procedures and launch mission ru l e s .  
10. Obtaining deviat ions and waivers from development organi- 
zat ions t e s t  and checkout requirements, t e s t  and check- 
out  spec i f ica t ions  and c r i t e r i a  and launch mission rules 
which w i l l  not be f i l f i l l e d .  
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